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Abstract. The rationality (its presence or its absence) of the business, be it producer or 
consumer, has been a constant preoccupation of all those who dedicated their energy and 
talent on the sinuous road of the history of economic thinking. Without rational behaviour 
it was inconceivable to determine a development path. From this point of view the 
position of the great schools of thought is based, essentially, on two main approaches. 
The classics and the neoclassics had in mind the perfectly rational and well-informed 
individual. In reply, the institutional economy, in its old or new form (NIE), opposes to 
homo oeconomicus rationalis a narrow-minded and insufficiently informed homo 
contractualis. The consequences of this re-evaluation of the basics of the business’s 
potencies on the physiognomy of the theoretical approach and also on the results of 
practical actions are significant. Those linked to the bounded rationality hypothesis, an 
important operating concept in the analytical structures of NIE, may trigger debates on 
the theoretical basis of standard economics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The toughest reply NIE gave to neoclassic economics is related to the questioning of 
the principle of rationality. Not the principle of rational choice but that of perfect rationality 
based on which there have been build the well-known models of the producer and the 
consumer, the main characters of the neoclassic age. Even with the “bounded” rationality 
only, which contradicts the Cartesian spirit of neoclassicism, NIE renders obsolete its function 
maximizing calculus and becoming a “special” social science, methodologically speaking. 
(Ménard, 2003:7) 
The origins of the criticism of the (producer's or consumer's) Perfect Rationality 
Principle lie in the work of Th. Veblen and H. Simon. 
More than a century ago, Veblen ridiculed the excessive hedonism of the neoclassic 
economic individual with these memorable words: “The hedonist conception on man is that of 
a computer operating, at the speed of light, with information on comfort and discomfort, 
oscillating like a homogeneous particle of the desire for happiness under the impulse of 
stimuli, carried around but still remaining intact … Self-imposed in the space of elements, it 
turns symmetrically around its own spiritual axis until it is caught in the parallelogram of 
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rest, a particle of desire, self-sufficient as it used to be”. (Veblen, 1919:73-74) “The 
homogeneous particle” which Veblen had in mind perfectly resembles the “cubic centimetre” 
of homogeneous capital from J. Robinson’s Heresies, engaged in the same critical process of 
neoclassic “dogmatic invulnerability”. It is possible that Veblen thought of Edgeworth’s 
“diagram in a box” when he spoke about the “parallelogram of forces”, which includes, in a 
“rational” manner, pleasures and discomforts. In any case, Veblen’s words echoed. This is 
how H. Simon, claimed by the neoinstitutionalists as their spiritual mentor, adopts the 
individuals' “bounded rationality” hypothesis, accounting for the limited cognitive capacities 
and insufficient information. He is convinced that man is by far comparable to a 
programmable computer. 
If this thesis, taken from H. Simon, including the sustaining arguments, turned NIE 
into a “special” social science, it is as true that bounded rationality had the effect of a 
Pandora Box. It has reignited debates on other principles, subsequent or adjacent to 
rationality, opened new and generous directions in research, and created a background for the 
disputes between the “crowned heads” of NIE. Here are some sequences of what embracing 
bounded rationality meant. 
2. FROM MAXIMIZATION TO SATISFACTION 
“The introduction of bounded rationality hypothesis forces the economic researcher to 
ask himself about agents’ motivation and the way they perceive and understand the 
environment in which they act. Indeed, agents do not always act towards maximizing their 
personal interest (they can, for example, to behave in an altruistic manner), and the manner 
they can decode their environment depends, partly, on the <<mental construction>> they have 
in their head” (Chabaud, Parthenay&Perez, 2004:4). This quotation, representative for the 
comments on North’s work, tells us, at least three things: 
First: the agent’s perception of the environment cannot be a perfect one because of 
their limited cognitive capacity and imperfect information. 
Second: this operation interferes with “the agents' motivations” which may be 
hedonistic or altruistic. 
Third: “mental build-ups” have a major role in shaping the agent’s relation with the 
environment. 
All of them sustain the hypothesis that the individual is not a perfectly informed robot 
and that he cannot set objectives that are beyond his power, he cannot hanker for 
optimizations or maximizations. If rationality is limited, the businesses can only ascertain a 
strategy that meets their prospects. This rule can be applied both for the producers and for 
the consumers. Louis De Alessi considers that, once the idea of “meeting the prospects” is 
accepted, it eliminates the familiar dichotomy between the firms' tendency to maximize their 
profits, on one side, and the one of families and consumers to maximize their utility, on the 
other (De Alessi, 1983:66). This dichotomy, we may add, is determined by the reminiscence 
of the Objective Theory of Value which penetrated the neoclassical structures with the help of 
its mentor – A. Marshall. Dichotomic or not, integrated or not in the rules of the zero-sum 
game imposed by the acceptance of “objectivity” of the value produced only by means of 
human work, individuals in the NIE environment share a common feature: “they try to 
maximize their objectives, which implies a detailed knowledge of the possible alternatives, 
high capacity to process related information as well as vast time periods available, to make 
choices; in reality, they settle with a <<satisfying>> (rather than <<maximizing>>) level in 
the pursuit of their goals and stop searching for additional alternatives when they have been 
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3. IMPERFECT “MENTAL CONSTRUCTION”-IMPERFECT 
INSTITUTIONS. “PROCEDURAL RATIONALITY” 
  Veblen’s observation that a “mental construction” may also be “imbecile” has 
triggered over the years a vivid debate on the origin of inefficiency, a debate that is far from 
over. 
  Indeed, if we accept the idea that “the way in which individuals decode the 
environment” depends on their mental construction, which is the source for the creation of 
rules, then we can understand why North made such an effort to explain the persistence of 
inefficient institutions. Because there are, and the reality confirms it, inefficient institutions. 
They are the result of this chain of cause and effect: institutions = the reflex of mental 
construction; these mental constructions may be of higher quality or they may be “imbecile”; 
low-quality mental constructions = imperfect and inefficient institutions. 
  Faced with this scheme, one may cynically conclude that every nation has the 
institutions they deserve. We cannot stop here though, because neither neoinstitutionalists nor 
their supporters can. 
  Neoinstitutionalists offer three extra explanations and two solutions. 
  The first explanation comes from biology. From this area and especially from 
Darwin's theory, the theorists of economic evolution, via NIE, will find explanatory sources 
for what they consider to be “evolution” and “learning through imitation”. This is also the 
source for explaining the fact that not all individuals contribute to the same extent to the 
evolution of society. 
  The second explanation sends us to ideology (ideologies). We are particularly 
interested in the imperfect institutions in a country with a totalitarian ideology. In this case the 
institutions are “perfect” only for those in power; they assimilate these institutions and make 
them work for their personal interests. For all others these institutions are “imperfect”. Still, 
these institutions manage to survive in time. Why? Two motives are being considered: 
a)It is possible that the “critical mentality” should take more time to be built; 
b) If the above mentioned period of time is too long, a kind of “perverted” behaviour 
may appear, even towards these institutions. It is possible that certain individuals, through the 
means of “efficient” indoctrination, start to consider “irrational” any deviation or breach, by 
other individuals, of rules that are “imbecile” from the beginning, but to which they got used 
and on which they conceive their image of the “rational”. In this case, the chance for these 
institutions to survive is extremely large. 
  The last explanation comes from North. He notices that the difficulty of rationally 
anticipating the future faced by the businesses is also influenced by the fact that mental 
constructions they use represent just a condensed history. The present is little or not at all 
embedded in them. “Individuals analyse the environment and solve their problems by treating 
the information using already existing mental schemes” (North, 1981:20). Hence, North 
concludes that the rationality of agents is limited also because they judge the present and 
anticipate the future through clichés which are linked to an already consumed experience! Is 
there another way? The fact that we use history to understand the present and make 
predictions about the future is extremely common. Not so for North, it seems. 
  The solution is found in a hayekian manner, with reference to what is known as 
“procedural rationality”. 
  It starts from the premise, advocated by Hayek as well as by Misses, that the 
individual’s integration in the environment does not necessarily imply the understanding of 
the rules. They comply with and apply them not because they understand them, but for the 
fact that the results of their application lead to an accomplishment of their objectives. Once 
this is noticed, a great part of their behaviour becomes a simple routine. The rational character 
of this rule is attained, hence, through an indirect route: through human behaviour in 
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  In the case of the second solution, neoinstitutionalists take into account a highly 
normative-charged solution. The fact is that institutions are, essentially, human creations, 
hence nothing stops from supporting the agents that have a low cognitive capacity with a set 
of institutions that make it possible to reduce uncertainty and risk. 
4. LIMITED RATIONALITY – OPPORTUNISM -  
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 
  It has already been underlined the fact that NIE refuses complete information and 
perfect rationality philosophies, but not the model of rational choice. In the NIE environment 
individual behaviour remains rational, with and within the stated limits. But the NIE 
environment is the real world, unlike the neoclassic one, “built” out of standardized images in 
order to provide the ideal picture, the Nirvana. In the NIE world everything changes. 
Everything is a succession of circumstances. In a world without patterns and fixed 
landmarks, any ex-ante –type of judgement lacks real importance. The bounded rationality of 
the businesses also contributes to this fact. They still have to reach their objectives, follow 
their personal interests. How it is possible to satisfy one’s own interests when everything is a 
“construction yard”? The solution proposed by NIE lies in opportunism: the business is 
“allowed” to “change” his behaviour; in its pursuit of personal interest depending on the 
succession of circumstances. 
  Moral implications of opportunism appear to have had no influence on O. Williamson, 
preoccupied with setting up the trajectory of the business in a corporative governance 
framework. He tries, in order to “protect” himself, to relate to the philosophy of the school 
mentioned before writing that “this concept includes the classical and neoclassical view on 
personal interest (the simple <<search>>) and, eventually <<cheating>>.” (Williamson, 
1979:234, our underline.-I.P.) Just as many other neoinstitutionalists, Williamson accounted 
for his own evolution inside some concepts. Hence, on this subject, in an interval of six years, 
he no longer shares the classical and neoclassical point of view and writes that “Through 
opportunism I understand self-interest seeking with cheating” (Williamson, 1985:47). The 
“subtle forms of cheating” are no longer referred to as in terms of “possibility”. While 
Williamson looks the other way when it comes to “lies, theft and cheating” understood as a 
sacrifice which has to be made in order to avoid any breach of the business’s freedom of 
movement, the other neoinstitutionalists seem not to feel comfortable with the dead end to 
which bounded rationality, via opportunism, takes this analysis. They have reasons to do so. 
Not for a moment have they thought that their “contractual individual” will be different from 
classic and neoclassic “economic individual” by being able to lie and cheat just to reach his 
objectives. It is difficult to find arguments to defend the image of a cheater within an 
economy designed to be one of “civilized” rules and institutions. The price paid to cross from 
the perfectly rational individual to the “real” one, imperfect and with limited rationality, 
seems to be too high. 
  Relativization of the ex-ante judgements due to bounded rationality, imperfect 
information and environment mobility … must, also, find itself a solution. For NIE it bears 
the name of “incomplete contract”. This is, obviously, an answer to the complete neoclassical 
contract, one filled with provisions on price, quantity, quality, terms of execution, etc. These 
are clearly established. The institutionalist environment of imperfections has little to do with 
strictness. Between the date of signing and the date of execution, “the succession of 
circumstances”, may change for a number of n-times the initial terms of the deal. Also, 
cognitive limitations prevent a one hundred percent anticipation of what is going to take place 
in this period. This is why neoinstitutionalists act cautiously. They have the doors open to an 
“incomplete contract”. Certain pledges no longer function; the parts agree to adapt the 
stipulations of their contract according to circumstances. And adapting means just as many 
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adapting to circumstances we find ourselves on the similar field that provides 
“institutionalized” support for opportunism. 
5. APPROXIMATING REAL BEHAVIOUR USING  
THE AS IF HYPOTHESIS 
Just as Williamson finds in opportunism a refuge to reach a compromise between the 
business’s necessary freedom and his bounded rationality and power of anticipation, so does 
A. Alchian in using the AS IF methodological principle as an exit to saving, at least in 
appearance, the principle of necessary rationality. How does he do that? He transfers the 
problem to the market. For him, the dispute between rationality and irrationality has no 
meaning as long as the “battle” on the ground of rationality does not take place in the same 
space and at the same time when the working hypothesis is established. No, this confrontation 
takes place on the market. For Alchian, the market is the “selection environment”. All agents 
pass through its lattice. Only those corresponding to its functioning criteria are able to 
survive. Briefly, the market is populated by those who understand that they have no other 
alternative than responding to the “ungrateful” requests of minimal rationality: the cost must 
be lower than the income in order to leave place for profit. With regards to the actual size of 
the profit Alchian does not leave the line of thought of his school: not maximum profit, but 
accomplishment of goals. To justify the “modesty” of the business’s claims, he adds another 
element: the constraint imposed by risk and uncertainty. In his famous article from 1950, he 
builds a selection environment not only in constant movement, but also one above which there 
are floating the clouds of uncertainty (Alchian, 1950). And, how can one pretend, in such a 
framework, filled with uncertainty and unrest, maximum profit? Meeting the targets set will 
suffice. How does the environment – the market, solve this problem? By operating a selection 
and retaining only those who, even if they did not learn anything in school about the 
Hedonistic Principle and its marginal derivatives, act AS IF they knew everything or almost 
everything about this subject. In other words, the market operates by selecting “behaviour 
models”. Those who pass through the “customs” are those who are in line with the rules of 
the environment. The amount of these rules stands for a condensed experience, consumed in 
the spirit of rationality. The businesses, also inspired by a rationalist spirit (but without being 
preoccupied by it) take this experience and imitate it. Rather than rewriting the history of , it 
is more comfortable (“rational”) to duplicate it and eventually, transmit it. 
In conclusion, the rationality problem limited or not, does not derive, for Alchian, 
from inter-individual confrontations. Rationality is addressed to the selection environment – 
the market. It plays a vital and active role. By exposing themselves to its competitive 
environment, the businesses “find out” if their actions are more or less rational. And only 
those who behave according to the “AS IF” criterion and prove that that they know everything 
about the unwritten laws of rationality are integrated in the environment. With this spin, by 
sending the problem of rationality from the relations between individuals to the selection 
environment, Alchian thought he had saved the authentic principle. 
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